The receipt of the administrative rent and the minimal limit of the shadow transactions in the sphere of the state procurement placement

Abstract

The work of O.S. Belokrylova and M.A. Korytsev «The receipt of the administrative rent and the minimal limit of the shadow transactions in the sphere of the state procurement placement» is based on analyzing different theories of the  bureaucracy‘s opportunistic behavior. As a result, there has been revealed a number of reasons why the corruption behavior of the officials has reached in Russia the level of a mass institutional practice. These reasons have been concretized by the examples of the state-financed procurements placement – and first of all the holding of contract work auctions. The authors argue the lack of effect in the mechanism of imposing sanctions on the government customers. This allowed building a graphical model to define the minimal limit of the shadow transactions and revealing the increasing effect of the punitive measures on the minimal limit of latent agreements between the customer and one of the auction’s  participants.